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Social Justice, Social Norms and 
the Governance of Social Media 
 
Tal Z. Zarsky* 
 
I. Introduction and Background: Re-Introducing Four Forms 
of Governance 
 
Digital media generate a technological environment which 
allows for, and at times even creates, a thriving social 
discourse.  The dynamics unfolding throughout these networks 
– sometimes referred to as “social media” – enhance important 
autonomy-related rights such as freedom of speech, expression 
and association.  Yet the rich information flows enabled by 
these applications also generate abuses and social wrongs to 
both those participating in the discourse and external parties.  
They do so by enhancing speech-related torts, privacy breaches, 
IP infringements and other problems. 
In response to the challenges posed by these realms, 
various forms of governance have arisen: rules that detail 
conduct which is permitted and forbidden throughout these 
digital settings, as well as an apparatus to enforce them.1  The 
role of formulating and applying governance was usually 
 
 * Professor, University of Haifa, Faculty of Law. I thank my Israeli and 
German co-researchers in the multi-year project, which produced the findings 
here discussed, for their cooperation, as well as for their thoughts regarding 
many of the ideas here noted: Niva Elkin-Koren, Wolfgang Schulz, Gustavo 
Mesch, Jan-Hinrik Schmidt, Martin Lose and Marcus Oermann. I also thank 
Ilan Saban for his insights and Rotem Medzini for his contribution to this 
project. I further thank Ayelet Oz and Malte Ziewitz for participating in a 
workshop devoted to this project, and held at the University of Haifa. In 
addition, I thank Eyal Mashbetz and Jordan Scheyer for their research 
assistance. Finally, I thank Leslie Garfield and the organizers of the "Social 
Media and Social Justice" Symposium at Pace Law School for their comments 
and hospitality. This study received generous initial funding from the 
Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society (Berlin). 
1. For a recent discussion of the concept of governance in this, and the 
broader, context, see Markus Oermann et al., Approaching Social Media 
Governance (HIIG Discussion Paper No. 2014-05 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2498552. 
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vested in the state, but the term no longer pertains exclusively 
to the acts of government.2  Instead, the online environment 
creates other interesting options.  It introduces governance 
measures applied through the internal actions of the private 
and commercial platforms which operate the relevant digital 
platforms. 
The digital media platforms’ ability to engage in 
governance is manifested on several levels. Most prominently, 
the platforms control the technological architecture, which they 
create and amend at will.  In this technological setting the 
platforms can take active steps that directly impact their users 
within the social media: they can limit the possible interactions 
users might engage in, or the information they can review or 
distribute.  They can also apply their control of the 
architectural design to impose sanctions, which might vary 
from warnings, through content deletion and even to account 
termination. In other words, the platforms can engage in 
governance by code.3 
These somewhat aggressive governance steps are further 
enabled by the Terms of Use, accepted (at least formally) by the 
social media users when they begin their virtual activity across 
the platform.  Such terms are often considered to be part of a 
formal contractual agreement between the user and the 
platform operator.4  In other words, the actions carried out 
through code are backed by the contractual language governing 
the relation of platform users with controllers.  Furthermore, 
 
2. See IAN BROWN & CHRISTOPHER MARSDEN, REGULATING CODE: GOOD 
GOVERNANCE AND BETTER REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE 12, 126 
(William J. Drake & Ernest J. Wilson III eds., 2013) (noting that the origins 
of the term "governance" lie in discussions of "self-regulation"). 
3. This phrase is clearly borrowed. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND 
OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).  A similar idea was raised by Joel 
Reidenberg. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of 
Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1998). For 
a recent discussion of this element, see Oermann et al., supra note 1, at 10. 
See also discussion of this concept by Margaret Radin, who refers to it as 
"machine rule."  MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, 
VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 47 (2013). 
4. These agreements are in fact standard form contracts which present a 
specific set of concerns in general and in the online environment in 
particular. See generally Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract 
Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form Contracting in the Age of Online User 
Participation, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 303 (2008). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/6
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the contractual framework immunizes platforms from future 
claims regarding the legitimacy of their actions.  When 
platforms act on the basis of these legal documents they are 
thereby governing by contract. 
At first glance these two methods of governance (through 
code and through contract) dominate the social media realm.5  
Seemingly, decisions regarding governance are exclusively 
vested in a single, private and powerful intermediary. This 
private actor governs disputes and limits harms unilaterally 
and at its own discretion through the contracts drafted by its 
lawyers and the code written by its engineers. So prima facie at 
least, the situation portrayed here is problematic, and might 
even promote unfairness and injustice.  The notion that a small 
group of managers (who presumably control the engineers and 
lawyers) unilaterally set the rules regulating the social 
discourse is daunting. It seems to furnish an alarming example 
of the “outsourcing” of important social choices. This is 
especially true when these rules impact users’ core rights – 
such as their ability to engage in free speech or invoke privacy. 
While the individuals vested with the power to make such 
governance-based decisions might be talented and even 
qualified to do so, they will be mostly driven by financial 
incentives and will strive to boost their firms’ bottom line, thus 
blazing the trail to normatively unacceptable outcomes. 
This dynamic, one might argue, is in sharp contrast to 
governance by law: the prospect of governing conduct in these 
virtual spaces on the basis of laws and regulations. The 
foundations of such governance are quite different.6 They are 
set out by governments and legislators. These public actors are 
perceived as the representatives of the broader public and 
 
5. To a great extent, regulations via contract and via code are grouped 
together in this article. However, fundamental differences between the two 
exist. For instance, in some cases governance via code regulates behavior ex 
ante, as opposed to enforcing contracts, which regulates behavior ex post. In 
addition, regulation via code can in some cases enable "perfect enforcement," 
which is unavailable through other models of governance. These distinctions 
are beyond the scope of our current discussion. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE 
FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 109 (2008). 
6. RADIN, supra note 3, at 36 (explaining the difference between 
governance by law and by contract, while noting that the latter erase the 
safeguards of the polity). 
3
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promote their interests and preferences. Indeed, laws govern 
some of the situations arising in social media (through privacy 
and IP laws), although the governance choices set forth in this 
manner are at times circumvented or ignored.7 
That said, governance by contract or code might not be as 
bad as it sounds. One can convincingly argue that these forms 
of governance are in fact a reflection of the platform users’ 
normative preferences. These are signaled to the platform 
operators by means of the various feedback mechanisms 
(formal and informal) that the technological environment 
provides. If such signaling is indeed unfolding, social media are 
largely, and at least by proxy, still governed by the users’ social 
norms. Yet rather than reflecting the public’s values as set 
forth in an election process, it reflects norms as signaled by the 
public in the open market.8 
The question whether forms of governance by “code” and 
“contract” are aligned with the users’ social norms is therefore 
crucial. The answer might provide important insights into the 
need for further regulation of the social media realm. If “code,” 
“contract” and “social norms” are all indeed aligned, social 
media might not require substantial governance by law, absent 
specific normative justifications. And regardless of this issue, 
regulating social media by government has several evident 
disadvantages. Governments are ill-equipped to deal with legal 
challenges arising at the cutting edge of the technological 
environment in which social media develop. In addition, like 
any other highly complex regulatory process that relies on 
external feedback, the regulatory process might be tainted by 
political interests and lobbying.9 Accordingly, many benefits 
might follow if the public’s preferences could be met without 
direct government intervention. 
Against this, a variety of convincing arguments could be 
made that only governance by government can achieve fairness 
 
7. Anne-Marie Zell, Data Protection in the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the European Union: An Unequal Playing Field, 15 GERMAN L. J. 461 
(2014) (discussing how Facebook.com escaped regulation by law in Germany). 
8. Here one might argue that these two sets of preferences need not be 
identical. See CASS SUNSTEIN, THE REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 128 (2009). 
9. See Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: 
Regulation, Self-Regulation, or Co-Regulation?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439, 
440 (2011) (for a brief discussion of the central arguments in this context). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/6
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and justice at this juncture, given inherent market and other 
failures.10  The analytical discussion as to whether the 
governance of social media via “contract” or “code” (as opposed 
to “law”) should be considered harmful, reasonable, or perhaps 
even beneficial, is extremely complex. There are seemingly 
convincing arguments to be made on both sides – those calling 
for more governmental intervention and those calling for less. 
In an attempt to introduce yet another important insight into 
this crucial debate, recent empirical studies have begun 
exploring the relations among the foregoing forms of 
governance.  This article reports an initial discussion of 
findings produced by a team of legal scholars and sociologists 
from Germany and Israel (in which the author had the 
privilege of participating) which approached this empirical 
challenge.11  The empirical study is to some extent a much 
needed extension of the theoretical work originally done by 
Lawrence Lessig.  In his seminal 1999 book Code, Lessig 
identified “code,” “law,” “markets” and “social norms” as the 
key forces which shape and regulate the online environment.12 
This joint empirical study strives to develop tools to measure 
and thus compare the four somewhat abstract concepts, while 
focusing on their role in governance and the context of social 
media. 
The empirical study aimed to achieve its objective by 
developing and applying a complex and multidisciplinary 
methodology which strives to measure and compare the four 
forms of governance.13  Among other things it formulated and 
applied tailored online surveys to establish the nature of social 
norms in the social and technological setting and context 
discussed here.  This article will focus on a portion of this 
survey’s findings, and provide an initial discussion of its 
results.  Given the numerous factors this study entails, the 
preliminary test case under discussion here examines a specific 
 
10. Id. 
11. GUSTAVO MESCH & JAN SCHMIDT, PRIVACY-RELATED ATTITUDES AND 
PRACTICES ON FACEBOOK (Oct. 2013) (Joint Report Germany-Israel) (on file 
with author).  For a discussion of other elements of this study, see generally, 
Oermann et al., supra note 1. 
12. LESSIG, supra note 3, at 88. 
13. For an additional discussion as to how this methodology integrates 
these factors, see Oermann et al., supra note 1, at 8. 
5
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issue: a subset of privacy governance on the Facebook 
website.14  Resting on the study’s findings, this article will 
extrapolate to the broader issues of fair and just governance, 
and strive to shed some light on this emerging debate. 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows: Part II 
briefly addresses the theoretical arguments regarding the pros 
and cons of various governance strategies, focusing on the 
advantages, disadvantages and pitfalls of reliance on private 
parties.  In Part III, the article describes, in general terms, the 
above-mentioned empirical study, explaining its methodology, 
the specific challenges to its design and implementation, and 
how these were met. The discussion specifically centers on a 
survey taken to establish the nature of social norms. Part IV 
presents a specific test case: whether pseudonymity should be 
permitted in social media or should “real names” be mandatory. 
Part V briefly discusses insights that the “real names” test case 
might provide for the broader questions regarding justice and 
fairness in social media governance. The article concludes with 
yet another context, the “right to be forgotten,” which might 
provide additional insights into the important research 
questions this project and others begin to address. It further 
notes additional extensions of the methodological design this 
article introduces. 
An important caveat is due. While the article strives to 
argue a normative point as to the fair, just and proper way to 
govern social media, it draws on empirical findings regarding 
users’ actual social norms. Clearly, however, there are 
numerous examples of situations demonstrating descriptive 
social norms to which can hardly be considered a normative 
baseline to aspire. In fact social norms embraced by the 
majority might reflect prejudice, errors and the inability to 
adapt to social changes. In some instances, especially those 
pertaining to information privacy,15 the “crowd” might not be 
wise at all.16 For these reasons, the policy implications and 
 
14. For a discussion of a different subset of this study, one that focuses 
on the posting and dissemination of photos on Facebook, see Oermann et al., 
supra note 1. 
15. Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the 
Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1883-88 (2013). 
16. For a popular discussion of such instances in the general context see 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/6
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recommendations to be derived from the discussion that follows 
are noted carefully, and must be subjected to additional 
considerations and scrutiny.  Nevertheless, establishing 
whether governance methods, as applied in these innovative 
settings, are objectively fair and just, is extremely difficult if 
not impossible.  Thus, reliance on imperfect proxies such as the 
nature of “social norms” will surely prove constructive. 
Therefore, examining the differences between these four 
subsets of governance (“code,” “contract,” “law,” and “social 
norms”) can provide us with insights into the “justice” of the 
governance administered by the platform provider and address 
the nuances of this intriguing reality. 
 
II. Governance by Government / Governance by Firms: 
Benefits and Detriments 
 
A. General Intuitions 
 
Social media provide a fertile ground for promoting 
important social objectives.  They might also generate 
substantial harms in the form of speech-related torts.  Other 
forms of media, such as broadcast TV and radio, have 
traditionally been subjected to a comprehensive regulatory 
framework.17  Yet the aggressive “command and control” form 
of regulation which was often applied to these latter contexts is 
in an overall decline.18  Other methods are gaining favor,19 such 
as co-regulation (which involves a joint effort by both 
government and industry),20 applying codes of conduct21 and 
 
MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 72 
(2005) (addressing among other things the election of Warren Harding as 
U.S. President – according to some, the worst president ever elected). 
17. See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL 
CROSSROADS: AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 
239 (2005) ("the FCC's spectrum management regime remains an exemplar of 
'command and control' regulation.”). 
18. Id. (discussing the move "beyond command-and-control"). 
19. See BROWN & MARSDEN, supra note 2, at 2-3. 
20. See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 465. 
21. MONROE E. PRICE & STEFAAN G. VERHULST, SELF-REGULATION AND THE 
INTERNET (2005). 
7
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self-regulation.22  The argument for these latter forms of 
regulation is especially strong in technological realms, where 
expertise is mostly found outside of government.23 
In respect of social media, the regulatory frameworks 
discussed here will practically always pertain to private 
entities currently operating these media realms.  Applying 
aggressive governmental regulation to such private entities is 
not a step to be taken lightly.  Furthermore, and as opposed to 
regulatory issues involving the media in the past, the 
operational environment is not one considered “public” by 
nature (such as TV and radio making use of the 
electromagnetic spectrum)24 or among those that benefited 
from massive governmental subsidies and other privileges in 
the past (such as telecom or cable operators).25  So it should 
come as no surprise that government largely shied away from 
extensively regulating of social media.  Instead, governance of 
these realms was conducted by the private parties themselves. 
Yet one can easily formulate arguments for greater 
governmental intervention, among other ways through 
governance, in social media.  Such arguments could be set on 
both an intuitive and an analytical level.  Intuitively, the 
notion that decisions regarding the public’s privacy- and 
speech-related rights (and others) be left to private, for-profit 
entities is, on the face of it, unacceptable.26  It is for the 
government, one would immediately and categorically declare, 
to decide the extent of these rights given their foundational 
importance. 
On a deeper, analytical, level, one might claim (1) that 
government alone can furnish the governance and rule-making 
 
22. Hirsch, supra note 9, at 440; ZITTRAIN, supra note 5, at 152. 
23. See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 440. 
24. See STUART M. BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND 
POLICY 30 (2d ed. 2006) (noting that the spectrum is closely regulated by 
government because it presumably "owns" it, but ultimately explaining that 
this intrusive level of regulation is justified for other reasons). 
25. Arguably, this logic should apply to the internet as well, as it 
resulted from various projects funded by the U.S. Defense Department or 
other academic sources. However, this argument, which is something of a 
stretch factually, might pertain to the internet's current infrastructure but 
hardly to the software tools used in popular social media today. 
26. See LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE 
170 (2014). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/6
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process with proper checks and balances; and (2) that 
government alone acts as the legitimate representative of the 
people, therefore only the governance structure erected by the 
state may be applied.27  Let us examine and closely scrutinize 
these two general arguments. 
 
B. The (Perceived) Benefits of a Private “Decider” 
 
The two noted presumptions regarding the superiority and 
advantages of government-led governance of social media can 
be challenged.  First, let us turn to the notion of checks and 
balances that government, as opposed to the firm, is able to 
provide.  In some settings which relate to digital media this 
presumption need not prove true.  It is the firm, rather than 
the government, that benefits from greater insulation against 
unwanted pressures, and can reach proper decisions – 
decisions which can prove efficient, fair and just.  For instance, 
in a recent thoughtful and provocative essay titled “The 
Deciders,” Jeffery Rosen seriously considers the idea that the 
firm, rather than the government, is best suited for handling 
decisions on the governance of discourse in social media.28  In 
doing so, Rosen introduces “The Decider”: Google’s deputy 
general counsel (at the time), Nicole Wong. 
During her tenure at Google, Wong (who later moved from 
Google to Twitter, and is currently working for the White 
House)29 was vested with the authority to decide “what goes up 
or comes down” on Google’s various sites – including the 
popular video sharing site, YouTube. Rosen reviews Ms. Wong’s 
actions favorably, commenting that she was “essentially 
codifying” the protection of free speech as opposed to both 
oppressive and even Western governments that at times 
suppressed it. In other words, Rosen explains that some firms, 
 
27. See BROWN & MARSDEN, supra note 2 (quoting former French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy). See a similar point made by RADIN, supra note 3, 
at 36. 
28. Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders: The Future of Privacy and Free Speech 
in the Age of Facebook and Google, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1525 (2012(. 
29. See Office of Science and Technology: Leadership & Staff, THE WHITE 
HOUSE, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ostp/about/leadershipstaff 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2014). 
9
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especially those that are considerably wealthy, are not bound to 
succumb to internal and external pressures, while governments 
often are.  This might be especially true of multinational firms, 
which enjoy substantial power when facing pressures from 
local politicians.  Governments, on the other hand, might at 
times strive to limit their citizen’s speech so to achieve various 
objectives.  So in such cases, the firm rather than the 
government might be the body whose conduct is closer to its 
users’ normative preferences. 
Rosen concludes his analysis on a more somber note.  He 
recognizes that firm-based decision-making on crucial issues 
related to free speech and other important human rights is 
unstable; in the long run, it is uncertain whether the firms and 
the platform they constructed can withstand commercial 
pressures.30  Rosen therefore concludes: “a user-generated 
system for enforcing community standards will never protect 
speech as scrupulously as unelected judges enforcing strict 
rules.”  In other words, firm-based governance has its limits 
and the state must, ultimately, step in. 
Rosen’s final assertion can be critiqued. While judges 
might “scrupulously” enforce rules, they may lack the training 
and understanding as to how that is done in the context of 
cutting-edge technologies.31  Moreover, by the time an issue 
reaches the courts it might be of limited relevance given the 
slow response time of the judiciary.  Finally, judges too are 
subject to local pressures and of course local law.  Hence 
Rosen’s initial endorsement of the firm’s governance authority 
might still be with merit, and the first argument promoting 
state governance is not without problems.  Therefore, it is 
advisable to continue seeking the problematic aspects of 
governance by firms in this specific context. 
 
C. Governance by Code and Contract: “Top-Down” or “Bottom-
Up”? 
 
As noted above, one might argue that regulation via code 
 
30. Rosen, supra note 28, at 1527. 
31. For a similar discussion see Tal Z. Zarsky & Norberto Nuno Gomes 
de Andrade, Regulating Electronic Identity Intermediaries: The “Soft eID” 
Conundrum, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1335, 1397 (2013). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/6
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or contract is unacceptable as it merely reflects the position of 
the firm, rather than that of the public.  Yet the firm-based 
governance dynamics unfolding in the social media need not 
fail to represent the thoughts and preferences of the people. 
The process whereby the platform formulates its strategy for 
both “code”- and “contract”-based governance need not be 
strictly “top-down” but could involve a “bottom-up” flow of 
information.32  The latter process might take several forms.  It 
might be explicit, in which case users will debate the form of 
proper rules and agree on a framework eventually 
implemented by the firm.  Hence the governance then adopted 
will be an extension of the public’s preferences.  This dynamic 
is indeed part of Wikipedia’s governance structure.33  Still, 
Wikipedia is admittedly the exception rather than the rule for 
entities operating in the social media space.  Such direct user 
influence is in fact rare. 
Alternatively, users might impact the firm’s governance 
practices indirectly and implicitly.  This dynamic could unfold 
through the users’ complaints and interaction with the firm, 
while using Web 2.0 tools.  For instance, on occasion social 
media firms such as Google and Facebook have offered novel 
services which their users found unacceptable.  After vocal 
complaints and debates these firms changed their policy and 
technology to meet users’ demands.34 
Yet this claim regarding a persistent and sustainable 
“bottom-up” dynamic in social media must be taken with more 
than a grain of salt: the existence of “bottom-up” feedback loop 
 
32. See RADIN, supra note 3, at 34 (explaining that public ordering is a 
top bottom process and private ordering – bottom-up). 
33. See Wikipedia: Policies and Guidelines, WIKIPEDIA (last modified 
Sept. 13, 2014 4:43 AM), 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Policies_and_guidelines#Life_cycle. 
See discussion of this example of self-regulation and governance in ZITTRAIN, 
supra note 5, at 143-46. 
34. For a discussion of ten such instances which pertained to Google and 
Facebook, see Ira Rubinstein & Nathan Good, Privacy by Design: A 
Counterfactual Analysis of Google and Facebook Privacy Incidents, 28 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1333, 1377-1406 (2013). See similar discussion in Robert 
Brendan Taylor, Consumer-Driven Changes to Online Form Contracts, 67 
N.Y.U ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371 (2011-2012( (generally examining what 
triggered the firm's "capitulation" to social pressures which led to changes in 
their contracts and practices). 
11
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is supported by no empirical evidence.  Rubinstein’s and Good’s 
analysis of privacy fiascos involving Google and Facebook 
illustrates a variety of responses by firms in such cases. 
Sometimes firms have made minor changes to benefit their 
users; sometimes they have quietly weathered the storm of 
criticism but have done nothing in practice.  And of course, in 
specific cases firms have made substantial changes in their 
policy and practices.35  Yet these latter cases are merely 
anecdotal and cannot prove the existence of a systematic 
pattern of governance.  An additional study found similar 
results.36  Therefore, at present it is difficult to assert that the 
governance structure offered by firms is one to which their 
users substantially contribute.  However, the firm’s governance 
might also be a reflection of users’ preferences (and not only 
their own) given various economic forces impacting the firms’ 
actions – a notion the article now moves to discuss, applying 
thereto previous legal discussions which addressed remarkably 
similar premises. 
 
D. Social Media and Economic Forces, or Nanny Corporations 
and Virtual Company Towns 
 
It is possible that firms are in fact adequately responding 
to the bottom-up pressures of their users as part of a broader 
response to market signals, and are doing so appropriately, 
without direct government intervention.  This different set of 
arguments regarding the pros and cons of government - and 
firm-based governance models is rooted in the “Law and 
Economics” literature, especially its analysis of “nanny 
corporations.”  Todd Henderson set forth a comprehensive 
argument as to the advantages of governing by the decisions of 
corporate entities, as opposed to those of government.37  It 
should be noted that this law and economics-based discussion 
mostly addresses the fears that firm’s will adopt “paternalistic” 
 
35. Rubenstein & Good, supra note 34, at 1405-06. 
36. See Taylor, supra note 34, at 392 (finding that when examining such 
events involving social pressures and privacy breaches, the firms' actions "did 
not frequently result in capitulation.”). 
37. See M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1517 (2009). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/6
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norms, so to speak, which are stricter than those the public 
finds necessary.38  However, with some alternations, it could be 
applied to the context at hand, which addresses a broad array 
of instances in which public opinions and rules set by firms 
diverge. 
Social media websites are a relatively new dynamic, yet 
this discussion of firm governance was already discussed in the 
past.  A common context of governance discussions in the 
literature is the “company towns” of former times: residential 
areas built and operated by firms for their employees.39  The 
resident/employee living in such a town was required to abide 
by the local rules, which at times included monitoring and 
restrictions of various behaviors.40  In other words, in company 
towns individuals were subject to governance by the firm in 
almost all areas of their lives – including those pertaining to 
basic human rights and values.  The company town, in its 
classic format, rarely exists in the U.S. today.  Still, one can 
easily argue that social media are a modern variation of this 
older concept. 
On its face, the firms’ should be motivated to respond to 
their users (or employees) preferences.  However, governance 
by nanny corporations might lead to problematic outcomes – a 
lesson we might want to carry over to the present.  Henderson 
recognizes two reasons for errors (and thus, inefficiencies) 
which might follow from the governing initiatives of the firm: 
miscalculating the potentially negative consequences of 
restricting individual liberties, and trying to use their power to 
impose selfish and socially costly preferences.41  In other words, 
the market forces impacting the firms’ conduct will not 
properly account for democratic and other non-monetary 
interests.42  Margaret Radin has recently referred to similar 
dynamics as “democratic degradation” which follows when 
firms displace state regulation.43 
Accordingly, for an argument regarding the efficiency and 
 
38. Id. at 1523. 
39. Id. at 1535. 
40. Id. at 1536-37. 
41. Id. at 1532. 
42. Id. at 1583. 
43. RADIN, supra note 3, at 33. 
13
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success of governance by firms to prevail and overcome these 
shortcomings, it must be premised on several assumptions and 
claims (which Henderson sets forth) which point to the 
advantages firms have over governments.  Let us examine 
three of such assumption and arguments, and their relevance 
to the social media context.  First, firms are more agile by 
nature.  They can frequently tailor their relevant policies, and 
the impact of such changes will materialize faster.44  They can 
also engage in greater experimentation on their way to 
achieving an optimal outcome.45  Governmental rules and 
restrictions, on the other hand, are sticky.  It is also quite 
difficult to change a rule once it is put in place.46  This point is 
especially pertinent to the present context.  Firms can easily 
alter governance by changing both the contract and the code 
which are both relatively flexible, while the government’s 
response will be much slower. 
Yet Henderson’s next two assumptions are quite far-
fetched when applied to our specific context – social media. 
Second, Henderson further argues firms are subject to greater 
oversight than politicians, therefore are the preferred 
nannies;47 and third, that individuals can, with greater ease, 
opt out of the relevant firm’s governance.  Opting out of the 
state’s jurisdiction is far more costly.  Thus firms – not 
governments – will compete for people’s patronage and 
attention, and provide governance rules which are normatively 
acceptable to them. 
Establishing whether governments or firms are subject to 
the greater external oversight in the social media context is 
extremely complex.  The intuitions noted by Henderson could 
be countered.  The fact that the social media firms are both 
multi-national and powerful renders effective oversight 
difficult.  In addition, governments have taken steps to 
enhance their transparency – especially with regard to 
lobbying activities.48  Therefore, this oversight-based 
 
44. See Henderson, supra note 37, at 1561. 
45. Id. at 1575. 
46. Id. at 1561, 1572-73. 
47. Id. at 1534. 
48. See, e.g., MICAH SIFRY, WIKILEAKS AND THE AGE OF TRANSPARENCY 73 
(2011). 
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assumption is at best speculative in this context.  It cannot 
provide clear insights into the governance debate at hand. 
Perhaps the empirical tests presented below will shed light on 
this issue. 
The third assumption and claim is even shakier than the 
second in the social media context.  While opting out of a 
jurisdiction is indeed very hard, the current market structure 
renders opting out of the relevant contractual framework, 
hence out of the social media, almost equally difficult.49  When 
users engage in social media, their costs to switch to another 
such realm are high.  Several lock-in effects also come into 
play.50  Furthermore, given the high barriers to entry, in many 
instances sufficient alternative platforms might not exist in 
social media markets.  Again, empirical evidence might prove 
helpful in resolving this difficult matter of which realm is 
easier to exit.  However, when opting out is of limited 
feasibility, firms will have limited incentives to meet the 
public’s preferences, and the state will be forced to intervene.  
In sum, the social media might prove a poor “corporate nanny” 
because the governance applied will presumably be strictly 
“top-down” rather than “bottom-up,” given the failure of the 
implicit signaling process noted above. 
Yet even if (and as noted, in this context it is a very big 
“if”) and when Henderson’s three assumptions are met, the 
governance laid down by a “nanny corporation,” in a corporate 
town or anywhere else, might fail to generate an efficient and 
fair framework due to additional signaling failures.  As noted, 
this might occur with regard to issues pertaining to democratic 
values.  Such outcomes might result from “collective action” 
problems – namely the overall damage from the firm’s conduct 
will be enormous, yet quite limited for each particular user who 
is unable or unwilling to signal her full discontent.51 
In addition, as Cass Sunstein argues, individuals conduct 
 
49. See RADIN, supra note 3, at 40. 
50. See Ruben Rodrigues, Privacy on Social Networks: Norms, Markets, 
and Natural Monopoly, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND 
REPUTATION 237, 246–49 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010); 
Randal C. Picker, Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1, 6–8 (2008). 
51. Henderson, supra note 37, at 1583. 
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themselves quite differently when assuming their role as 
consumers as opposed to their role as citizens.52  Thus, 
governance by government cannot be supplanted by that of 
firms.  In their capacity as citizens, individuals hold higher 
aspirations regarding the society they would like to live in.  As 
consumers, they might be merely interested in making the best 
deal.  While these two forms of behavior might, at times, seem 
contradictory they may not be, given people’s different 
mindsets when making decisions in these two capacities 
(consumers vs. citizens).  When deciding on the governance of 
social media, which indeed might impact important rights and 
values, people’s preferences at the ballot, rather than at the 
market (by selecting from various social media for their usage), 
should be heard and at times followed.  Therefore, governance 
should not be left to the firms but must be carried out by the 
government directly – as a proxy of the citizen’s relevant 
preferences for the issues to be governed.  The “bottom-up” 
process in establishing a firm’s governance might therefore be 
in play, but is still insufficient by nature to reflect all the 
relevant and required preferences. 
Sunstein’s theory could be sharply critiqued, undermining 
the argument for opting for governance by the state rather 
than deferring to market forces.  One can question if indeed 
individuals act differently in these two realms (consumers v. 
citizens).  Perhaps the individuals’ behavior is nuanced –as 
they choose to purposely indicate unachievable aspirations in 
the political realm.  Therefore, the only signals to be considered 
are those indicated when people reflect on realistic options and 
“put their money where their mouth is.”  Or one might argue 
that the market is where people’s true preferences are 
reflected.  This is as opposed to the political realm, where 
limited choices and other systematic distortions encumber one’s 
ability to express them properly and effectively.  Here again, 
the discussion could benefit from empirical testing. 
Another potential concern with and caveat to the “bottom-
up” governance-by-firms process pertains to the multi-national 
presence of the firms discussed here.  As noted, the firms’ 
global nature potentially strengthens their ability to reject 
 
52. SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 128. 
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local pressures, and thus rendering governance by code or 
contact an optimal governance option.53  However, one might 
argue that a firm’s global presence leads it to also reject the 
local specific preferences presented by both government and 
users at their specific location.  Rather, in order to promote 
efficiency, such a firm will opt for standardized global 
governance rules, which might merely cater to the majority of 
their users, to those in the firm’s country of origin, or to a 
common denominator of all user norms set by the firm.  In any 
event, the governance applied will have limited linkage to the 
specific users’ preferences or signaling in any given state.  
Thus, one might argue, at least with global firms, actual 
governance practices have little to do with the local laws and 
social norms, and are almost exclusively governed by the firms’ 
strategy (which might be quite different) as dictated by both 
code and law.  Stronger laws with a global reach must be put in 
place to assure that the users’ preferences are properly 
considered. 
However, the global presence of a social media platform 
need not mean that it will categorically set aside local laws and 
norms.  Indeed, firms can and do offer different interfaces54 and 
contractual language55 to different users, based on their 
geographical location.  Given the flexibility of the digital realm, 
engaging in governance-by-geographical segmentation is doable 
and is indeed unfolding.56  Thus, the firm’s disregard for local 
laws and norms cannot necessarily be explained by its global 
presence and calls for additional discussion.  Still, future 
studies should perhaps probe whether the governance 
dynamics for global and local platforms present substantial 
differences and therefore must be examined separately.  
 
 
53. See supra Part II.D. 
54. See, e.g., Search Removal Request under Data Protection Law in 
Europe, GOOGLE, 
https://support.google.com/legal/contact/lr_eudpa?product=websearch&hl=en  
(last visited Oct. 1, 2014) (Google's new form for merely EU users, allowing 
them to invoke their "right to be forgotten.").  See discussion infra note 86 
and related text. 
55. See, e.g., infra note 91 and relevant text. 
56. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE 
INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (2008). 
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E. Governance of Firms and Spheres of Justice 
 
As a final step in the analysis of governance methods, let 
us set aside efficiency considerations as well as the “law and 
economics” perspective, and question the fairness and justice of 
allowing firms to govern all elements of our lives – especially 
those that relate to crucial rights and values.  This argument is 
strengthened in instances where the firm’s governance is “top-
down” and does not reflect the public’s choices.  Again, similar 
questions have been raised in the past in the context of the 
“company town.”  In his important book Spheres of Justice, 
Michael Walzer addresses this matter directly.  Discussing the 
company town of Pullman, Illinois,57 he finds it unacceptable 
that a firm could leverage its control over property into control 
of people’s lives, in a feudalism-like dynamic.  Allowing a small 
group of individuals – the company’s executives and owners – 
to control the lives of others is unjust.  This argument fits well 
within Walzer’s broader thesis that power should not be 
allowed to migrate and transform from one sphere (in this case 
ownership of property) to another (control over other 
individuals’ lives).58 
Even though Walzer penned this argument over thirty 
years ago and in a different context, it could be smoothly 
transposed into the social media discussion.  Here the firm’s 
control over a proprietary website, the related technologies and 
relevant IP rights cannot be tantamount to its assuming the 
right to dictate the public’s preferences regarding important 
rights such as information privacy and free speech.  In the 
“company town” context, Walzer explains that the firms should 
not be allowed to extend their influence beyond the 
manufacturing plant and into the employee’s home.  In our 
context the firms’ influence can extend far beyond thousands of 
employees to millions of users impacted by the firm’s 
governance strategy.  Such control should therefore be 
considered unjust. 
Yet the “company town” analogy has its limits.  In the case 
 
57. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND 
EQUALITY 295 (1983). 
58. Id. passim. 
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of Pullman, Illinois, a firm was able substantially to impact its 
employees’ physical lives by controlling all aspects round the 
clock – with the noted exception of the employee’s important 
right and ability to opt out and move away.  The social media 
are powerful, but nonetheless still virtual.  Governing social 
media might not necessarily mean that the firms control their 
users’ lives in a way deemed unjust.  Indeed, courts have 
refused to find online realms analogous to “company towns” in 
the past for this precise reason, in the context of defining a 
“public forum.”59  Perhaps the migration of broader scopes of 
our lives (and our personal information) to the virtual world 
would lead courts to rethink this analogy, and indeed consider 
social media as possibly equivalent to company towns.  Should 
this occur, the “spheres of justice” argument might be relevant 
– and allow for framing the governance problems discussed 
here in consideration of the powerful concept of injustice. 
In conclusion, on the one hand, the noted theoretical 
review of possible justifications for relying on governance set by 
a firm (via contract or code) has yielded several interesting 
arguments.  On the other hand, strong arguments have been 
made for setting the firm’s governance initiatives aside and 
resting exclusively on governance dictated by the state.  Given 
the novelty of the situation at hand, the analysis has mostly 
adduced arguments voiced in somewhat different contexts. 
Neither set of theories could be seamlessly applied to the 
virtual realm of social media; each requires some tinkering, 
which might weaken their analytical force.  In addition, the 
basic arguments themselves are at times speculative.  It will 
therefore be helpful and important to add an empirical element 
to this inquiry. 
Before proceeding, note that legal scholarship has broadly 
addressed the relation of social norms arising in society to law 
on the books.60  These studies – most notably the work of 
Robert Ellickson – scrutinize the efficiency as well as the 
enforcement of these norms as part of an examination of the 
 
59. See Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 
20 BERKLEY TECH. L. J. 1115, 1135-42 (2005) (discussing, among other things, 
the Cyber Promotions cases). 
60. See discussion in Amitai Aviram, Path Dependence in the 
Development of Private Ordering, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 29 (2014). 
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dynamic of “private ordering.”61  The analysis above did not 
directly address this important strand of work.  The reason for 
such apparent neglect is that our current discussion is 
somewhat removed from this broader theme.  With social 
media, the norms are mostly dictated and enforced (with 
apparent success) by one firm.  In addition, the relevant social 
context differs from other “private ordering” settings in that it 
is not formulated from a great variety of contracts among 
parties, but in a one-to-many contractual framework.  For 
these reasons, many of the insights this weighty literature 
might provide are of limited relevance to this article’s focused 
discussion, and their examination is left for another day. 
III. Fair Governance – An Empirical Perspective 
 
A. General 
 
Beyond the normative analysis discussed, this article notes 
four models of governance unfolding in social media: (1) by 
code, (2) by contract, (3) by law, (4) by social norms.62  Each 
fulfills a role in the overall governance of this novel and 
important realm, yet how influential each is, is unclear.  As 
explained above, reliance on every one of these models 
generates both advantages and drawbacks.  Studying the 
relations among them is therefore interesting and important.  
It is interesting to try and establish the similarities and 
differences among these very different forms of governance, 
because such findings can provide insights into who in fact has 
the most substantial effect and thus, de facto, governs the 
social media (as well as other online realms).  Examining 
changes in these governance models might show the 
“evolution”63 of overall governance trends in the online realm. 
It might also provide explanations as to which external events 
 
61. See generally ROBERT  C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). 
62. For a similar discussion and mapping, see Oermann et. al., supra 
note 1, at 8. 
63. For a discussion of this issue, see Fred Stutzman, Ralph Gross & 
Alessandro Acquisti, Silent Listeners: The Evolution of Privacy and 
Disclosure on Facebook, 4 J. PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 7 (2013), available 
at http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1098&context=jpc. 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/6
  
174 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  35:1 
cause such changes.  Yet beyond academic interest, 
understanding the nature of the interactions among these 
governance systems will provide important guidance for 
regulators, giving them a better grasp of the best way to 
minimize problematic practices and maximize those that 
government deems preferable.  Policymakers will know which 
policy levers are destined to have the greatest effect, and thus 
utilize them to promote their various interests.  As explained 
above, the current study strives to introduce empirical findings 
into this theoretical discussion. 
 
B. Overcoming Challenges 
 
Empirically comparing the foregoing four governance 
methods presented several challenges, of which three central 
ones quickly surfaced.  First, the factors to be considered were 
numerous.  Secondly, comparing governance models was 
extremely difficult.  Thirdly, comparing these very different 
realms called for ensuring that the same issues could be 
addressed by measurable parameters on each of the four 
governance dimensions and that the parameters overlapped. 
The joint German-Israeli research group addressed these 
challenges in several ways.  To manage the vast scope of this 
research project, the initial study chose to focus on a modest 
objective: gathering information on privacy-related issues 
pertaining to a leading social media website, namely 
Facebook.com.  The choice of Facebook for the study is easily 
justified, as this specific medium provides invaluable insights 
into all four dimensions with relative ease.  Facebook generates 
a vibrant legal and policy discussion,64 so establishing the 
treatment of relevant laws and the governance they imply is 
relatively simple.  Facebook has both an extensive contractual 
and technological (i.e. “code”) framework, which facilitates their 
study.  And perhaps most importantly, its broad and global 
popularity makes for easy generation of surveys to establish 
the social norms governing its use.  Privacy also seemed to be 
an intuitive choice for such a policy-related study, given the 
 
64. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 
1137 (2009). 
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growing interest and concern it is currently generating 
worldwide.65 
Secondly, to further the comparison of very different 
parameters on distinct dimensions (as well as the ability to 
address other important issues such as the global effects of 
multinational platforms), the study added an extra layer: a 
comparative examination of these governance models in two 
legal and social systems, Germany and Israel. Both countries 
share some relevant traits; their legal systems have some level 
of privacy protection, the language used is non-English and 
Facebook has a substantial presence, reflected by considerable 
usage levels.66  Differences and similarities between these two 
countries should provide additional insight into the relations 
among the various governance forms.  Furthermore, to 
overcome the problem of comparing and measuring governance 
through code with other factors, in its first stage the study 
chose to rely on instances in which this governance parameter 
was constant in the two jurisdictions. 
Thirdly, to ensure that the study relied on a set of 
measurable and comparable factors for each of the four 
governance forms (and in each of the two jurisdictions – 
Germany and Israel), the study required a somewhat recursive 
process.  It called for extensive pretests for all eight governance 
realms (four forms of governance X two jurisdictions).  With 
each pretest the study sought to identify measurable 
governance points.  For instance, a pretest probed the context 
of “contracts” while examining which issues were addressed in 
the firm’s terms of use.  It later strove to match these issues 
with relevant laws, technical measures and indications of social 
norms (in the most elaborate part of the study, as detailed 
 
65. See case studies discussed in Rubinstein & Good, supra note 34. 
66. According to some reports, Israel has four million Facebook users as 
of May 2013; 2.4 million Israelis use the social network every day.  This leads 
to a remarkable almost 50% level of Facebook usage in Israel (given a 
population of around 8 million). Germany had 22 million Facebook users in 
February 2014, and ranked second among European countries.  Given 
Germany's population of almost 81 million, Facebook's usage rate per capita 
is roughly 27%.  For Israel, see Omer Kabir & Meir Orbach, Facebook 
Reveals: How Many Israelis Social Network Users?, CALCALIST [Hebrew] (May 
21, 2013). For Germany, see European Union, INTERNETWORLDSTATS (Aug. 
30, 2014 http://www.internetworldstats.com/europa.htm#de; see also sources 
noted in Oermann et. al., supra note 1, at 5. 
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below). After completing a basic round of pretests, the 
researchers were able finally to focus their efforts on the issues 
which overlapped in all eight governance realms tested, and in 
that way effectively to compare them. 
 
C. Measuring Social Norms: The Comparative Survey 
 
Perhaps the most challenging segment of this study of 
social media governance was the measurement of social norms. 
It was resolved by an online survey conducted by sociologists in 
Germany and Israel.67  To ensure that the issues examined 
matched factors measured in other governance dimensions, the 
survey was conducted last, although the prospect of the 
upcoming survey guided the selection of issues examined in the 
other three governance realms from the outset.  For instance, 
budgetary and other constraints, as well as the specific 
expertise of the team members, limited the survey to Germany 
and Israel.  This in turn led to focusing the legal and 
contractual analysis on frameworks pertaining to these two 
countries as well.  This explains why the study does not review 
the very interesting U.S. governance landscape. 
The survey’s text, which was applied (after painstaking 
translation to both German and Hebrew) in both Israel and 
Germany, was closely reviewed by all team members prior to 
distribution.  The survey, a questionnaire with 100 items, was 
digitally distributed to 309 Facebook users aged 18-35 years in 
Germany and Israel in October and November 2013.  Overall, 
the Israeli and German participants had similar demographic 
characteristics, with slight differences.68  The survey, which 
 
67. MESCH & SCHMIDT, supra note 11. 
68. The average age of the respondents was 27.12 years (SD=4.48) in 
Israel and 26.91 (SD=4.46) in Germany. The age difference was not 
statistically significant. As to gender composition, the samples of both 
countries were similar, 65% of the German sample were women compared to 
53% of the Israeli sample. Regarding marital status, in Germany 88% of the 
participants were single, while in Israel 57% reported not being married.  In 
terms of education, the samples were similar, as 52% of the Israeli sample 
had a college or graduate education compared with 57 % in Germany. Most of 
the respondents indicated that they access Facebook from home (93% in 
Germany and 87.5% in Israel). As for daily use, there is a statistically 
significant difference as Israeli users indicate they use Facebook on average 
94 minutes a day and Germans only 52 minutes. Future study will examine 
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took on average 47 minutes to complete, asked users about 
their perception of descriptive and injunctive norms69 and the 
extent of disclosure of personal information they engaged in on 
Facebook.com. 
The survey provided a rich array of findings on privacy 
attitudes of Facebook users in Germany and Israel.70  It is an 
important addition to a growing literature of recently published 
surveys, all of which addressed these issues.71  But the survey’s 
most salient (yet not necessarily apparent) innovative feature 
is its overlap with measurable and noticeable governance 
elements in the other dimensions.  Accordingly, this survey will 
no doubt promote the study of governance in social media.72 
As a first step of such a study, this article examines its 
perhaps most obvious findings – the points on which the study 
demonstrates significant differences among the governance 
realms. Thus, the discussion below focuses on one specific issue 
which yielded significantly different results from the Israeli 
and the German respondents: anonymity and the mandatory 
use of “real names.” The analysis below briefly examines the 
study’s overall interesting findings on this issue, the 
differences among the various governance dimensions that 
came to light, and their possible implications. 
 
IV. Analyzing a Governance Choice: Anonymity vs. Real 
Names 
 
 
whether this difference had a substantial impact on the results. 
69. For a discussion of the difference between these two sets of norms, 
see Oermann et al., supra note 1, at 17. 
70. MESCH & SCHMIDT, supra note 11. For an additional discussion of the 
survey, see Oermann et al., supra note 1, at 23, 32. 
71. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMM’N, EUROBAROMETER 359: ATTITUDES ON 
DATA PROTECTION AND ELECTRONIC IDENTITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_359_en.pdf; 
see also Noellie Brockdorff & Sandra Appleby-Arnold, What Consumers 
Think, Consent – Work Packages 7 & 8 (Mar. 2013), available at 
http://consent.law.muni.cz/storage/1365167549_sb_consentonlineprivacyconfe
rencemarch2013-consentprojectresultswhatconsumersthink.pdf (a set of 
surveys focusing on consumer sentiment regarding privacy in user-generated 
content services). 
72. For another paper resulting from this study, see Oermann et al., 
supra note 1. 
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A. General 
 
The Internet has famously promoted anonymous speech 
and conduct. “On the Internet,” the famous cartoon averred, 
“nobody knows you’re a dog.”73  Of course, this perception of 
apparent anonymity is greatly distorted.  Governments can, 
and in many instances do, track the online discourse, 
“connecting the dots” between the anonymous and actual 
speakers.  Commercial firms, especially those enabling the 
online discussion, can do so as well, to some extent.74  However, 
the online realm to some extent, still allows users to cloak their 
identity in anonymity, at least to other users.  Many websites 
allow surfers to propagate ideas under a pseudonym, or 
“handle.”75  The anonymity norm in online realms generates 
various benefits, mostly in the form of extensive and 
uninhibited speech.  However, anonymity has been known to 
generate detriments as well – especially hurtful speech aimed 
at society’s weaker groups.76 
Still, the anonymity of the online discourse is not set in 
stone (or perhaps, code). In recent years, especially in some 
realms involving social media, anonymity (even vis-a-vis other 
online users) has been supplanted by “Real Name” policies.  
The most recognizable example is the one applied by Facebook. 
Individuals are required to use their “real” offline names when 
registering for and interacting within this realm.77  The 
practice has generated significant discontent (dubbed by some 
the “Nym Wars”),78 but Facebook has not changed its policies. 
It is not likely to do so in the near future, in view of the 
presumed benefits that this identification strategy generates 
 
73. Peter Steiner, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You’re a Dog, NEW 
YORKER, July 5, 1993, at 61. 
74. See, e.g., There Is No Anonymity on the Internet, TEACHING PRIVACY 
(2014), 
http://teachingprivacy.icsi.berkeley.edu/theres-no-anonymity/. 
75. Zarsky & Andrade, supra note 31, at 1352. 
76. Id. at 1362 (discussing such benefits and detriments), Ronen Perry & 
Tal Zarsky, Liability for Online Anonymous Speech: Comparative and 
Economic Analyses, 5 J. EUR. TORT L. 205, 206 (forthcoming, 2014), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2448706. 
77. Zarsky & Andrade, supra note 31, at 1352. 
78. Id. at 1353. 
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for Facebook’s bottom line.79 
As noted, some critics have been quite vocal about the 
adoption of “real name” policies in online social media, but it is 
far from clear which form of identity management is 
normatively superior at this juncture, or will prove to be just 
and fair.  Both technological options – anonymity or 
compulsory identification – could be normatively justified.80 
Hence the governance of this specific trait of online social 
media conduct seems fertile ground for empirical testing and 
study, including an examination of subjective social norms. 
Therefore, the eight dimensions noted above – law, contract, 
code and social norms in the two legal and social jurisdictions 
of Germany and Israel are addressed here accordingly.  This 
context also invites application of the theoretical background 
noted above.  For instance, given that “real name” policies 
could be also considered (over-) protective of users (and not 
only merely a measure to promote corporate objectives), the 
rationales discussed pertaining to the acceptance or rejection of 
governance by a “nanny corporation” should apply, and the 
theoretical discussion of this concept could be examined in light 
of empirical findings. 
 
B. Governing “Real Names” – Law, Contract and Code 
 
Law: The anonymous/pseudonymous vs. real names 
governance context presents an interesting legal setting.  It 
brings to light differences between the two legal jurisdictions 
the study chose to examine – Israel and Germany.  This 
distinction will prove helpful in the quest for normative and 
operative conclusions, below.  Israeli law treats the right of 
anonymity with great respect. In one important Israeli 
Supreme Court case regarding defamation, the need to protect 
the right to anonymity, at least implicitly, led to the surprising 
finding that the court had no authority to expose the identity of 
 
79. Id. at 1356. 
80. For some limited justification for the use of "real names" see 
ZITTRAIN, supra note 5, at 228. For a debate on the suitability of possible 
mandatory attribution as opposed to possible pseudonymity in the national 
security context, see David D. Clark & Susan Landau, Untangling 
Attribution, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 531 (2011). 
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online anonymous defendants.81  A subsequent case regarding 
IP right recognized the rights of anonymous defendants in this 
context as well, albeit less rigorously.82  Israeli courts, however, 
have not objected to the use of “real name” policies as applied 
by private actors.  Nor are these issues addressed directly by 
Israeli laws.  So it is fair to assume that Israeli law takes the 
position of weakly endorsing online anonymity. 
The legal protection afforded anonymous speech is far 
greater in Germany.  German law provides strong rights 
protecting the individual’s control over his or her identity. 83 
More specifically, according to the German Telemedia Law, 
consumers of online services are entitled, among other things, 
to pseudonymous use of such services.84  The legality of 
Facebook’s “Real Names” policy, which blocks the effective use 
of pseudonyms, was recently examined by the German courts. 
While the case was eventually dismissed upon appeal on 
jurisdictional grounds (given that Facebook operates in 
Germany as a company with headquarters in Ireland), the 
lower court initially found that Facebook’s “Real Name” policies 
were at odds with the noted provisions of German law.85 Also, 
the proactive right to online pseudonymity in Germany has 
been reflected in a national ICT project,  namely the New 
German ID card enables the use of a pseudonym.86  Thus it is 
fair to conclude that German (as opposed to Israeli) law takes 
the position of strongly endorsing online anonymity. 
Code: throughout the Facebook social media platform, the 
governance of “Real Names” through code takes a very 
different turn from the interests reflected by law.  Here, the 
use of real names is deeply imbedded in the technological 
interface.  There is no significant difference between the 
 
81. CA 4447/07 Rami Mor v Barak ITC – Int’l Telecomms Corp. 63(3) PD 
664 [2010] (Isr.); see Perry & Zarsky, supra note 76, at 218. 
82. CA 9183/09 The Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. John Doe 
[2012] (Isr.); see Perry & Zarsky, supra note 76, at 219. 
83. Zell, supra note 7. 
84. Id. at 480. 
85. Id. at 481. 
86. See Marian Margraf, The New German ID Card, in ISSE 2010 
SECURING ELECTRONIC BUSINESS PROCESSES 367, 368 (Norbert Pohlmann et 
al. eds., 2011) ("the ID card must enable pseudonymous authentication"); 
Zarsky & Andrade, supra note 31, at 1353. 
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interface in Germany and in Israel on this point.  Interacting 
with Facebook, one is required to provide a “real name” during 
registration.  Naturally, the name of the specific user is 
prominently displayed at various points within the social 
media.  Yet the most prominent way in which the notion of 
exclusive usage of “real names” is governed is through 
sanctions.  Facebook can and at times does deactivate a user’s 
account when suspecting that the “Real Name” policy is not 
being followed.87  In addition, Facebook applies code-related 
governance through peer-reporting mechanisms.  The website 
allows (and even encourages) users to notify the operator if 
another user is applying a fake name – a notification measure 
which could launch the code-related sanctions.88 
Contract: As with code, the embedded contracts governing 
the Facebook realm enable and enforce the usage of “real 
names.”  Facebook’s Israel-based website indicates in its terms 
(which are in Hebrew, yet reflect the standard terms used 
elsewhere) regarding “Security” that when registering a user 
may not provide false information, and use only one account.89 
Other provisions allow for the subsequent enforcement (via 
code, as indicated above) of the rigid “real names” policy.90 
Facebook’s German-based website carries similar provisions. 
Importantly, however, it has several provisions written 
specifically for Germany.91  These were most likely put in place 
in view of a court case invalidating standard terms in online 
service agreements – especially those pertaining to the 
 
87. See for instance explanation on Why Was My Account Disabled, 
FACEBOOK (2014), http://www.facebook.com/help/245058342280723/. For a 
discussion of particular instances in which this sanction was applied, see 
Zarsky & Andrade, supra note 31, at 1336 (particularly discussing the facts 
involving Salman Rushdie). For a discussion of a partial limitation on 
exercising this right in Germany in view of a recent case, see infra note 92 
and related text. 
88. For Facebook's explanations as to how to use these buttons, see 
Report a Violation, FACEBOOK (2014), 
http://www.facebook.com/help/263149623790594/. 
89. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK § 4 (Nov. 15, 
2013), https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms/. 
90. Id. § 15. 
91. Terms for Users Residing in Germany, FACEBOOK (Apr. 20, 2012), 
http://www.google.com/translate?hl=en&ie=UTF8&sl=de&tl=en&u=http%3A
%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com%2Fterms%2Fprovisions%2Fgerman%2Findex.ph
p (translating http://www.facebook.com/terms/provisions/german/index). 
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operating website’s ability to unilaterally terminate an account 
without prior notice.92  However, these do not alter the 
requirement of users to abide by the “real name” policy.  The 
amended provisions relevant to the issue at hand merely 
somewhat dampen the harshness with which Facebook can 
move to terminate the user’s account.  They do, however, reflect 
an example as to how contractual frameworks respond to 
external events.93 
To sum up the analysis thus far, in both jurisdictions the 
analysis points to a divergence between the forms of 
governance which originate from the firm (code and contract) 
and the spirit of governance flowing from the state.  It is 
however clear that the divergence is greater in Germany than 
in Israel (even after accouting for the recent changes in 
contractual terms), given the difference between these two 
legal systems.  It will therefore be interesting to reveal the 
direction taken by the governance rules derived from the 
survey of the user’s social norms and what this might teach us. 
 
C. “Real Names”: “Survey Says. . .” 
 
Four survey questions pertained to users’ attitudes and 
preferences regarding the use of pseudonyms and/or “real 
names” on Facebook.  Findings from all questions show a 
statistically significant difference between German and Israeli 
respondents.  Table I below lists the questions and the average 
responses given (as well as their standard deviation).  The first 
question was directly to the point, inquiring whether the use of 
pseudonyms is acceptable on Facebook.  Responses were scaled 
 
92. For a discussion of this case, which pertained to the terms applied by 
Google, see Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Wolves of the World 
Wide Web: Reforming Social Networks' Contracting Practices, WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 53-54 (forthcoming 2015); see also Press Release, Federation of 
German Consumer Organisations Wins Lawsuit Against Google (Nov. 19, 
2013), available at http://www.vzbv.de/cps/rde/xbcr/vzbv/google-vzbv-press-
release-2013-11-19.pdf; Karin Retzer, German Court Finds 25 Provisions in 
Google’s Online Terms of Use and Privacy Policy to Be Unenforceable, 
SOCIALLY AWARE BLOG (Dec. 19, 2013). 
93. For a review of other instances where such changes unfolded, see 
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Brendan Taylor, Set in Stone? Change 
and Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
240, 248, 268 (2013). 
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from 0 (“never OK”) to 5 (“absolutely OK”).  The second 
question approached the same issue somewhat indirectly, 
asking how many of the respondents’ Facebook contacts 
considered their (the respondents) use of a pseudonym a 
positive activity, in this realm.  Responses were again from 0 
(“none”) to 5 (“all”).  For both questions, the average level of 
agreement with the use of pseudonyms was higher in Germany 
than in Israel.  These results indicate a more permissive norm 
in Germany supporting the use of Facebook without adhering 
to its “real name” policy. 
The next two questions took a different approach to this 
issue (thus limiting the chance that any finding would prove 
anecdotal).  They focused on users’ concerns about falling for a 
fake profile.  Arguably, groups of users with a preference for 
pseudonyms in social media would not consider this a serious 
problem, and vice versa.  This in fact proved to be the case. 
Respondents provided answers regarding such fears resulting 
from actions premised on fake profiles of both organizations 
and individuals on a scale from 0 (“not concerned”) to 5 (“most 
concerned”).  Again, there are statistically significant 
differences between the countries, with Israelis indicating, on 
average, a higher level of concern than Germans.  This result 
might be linked to the attitudes and preferences reflected in 
the previous questions.  Israelis are less likely to use 
pseudonyms on Facebook and therefore more concerned about 
being defrauded by a fake person or organization. 
From these survey results, it is possible to formulate a 
tentative understanding of the form of governance social norms 
would dictate for Facebook – one that would allow for the use of 
pseudonyms online.  The comparative perspective also shows 
that German users have stronger attitudes and preferences for 
the use of pseudonyms than their Israeli counterparts. 
 
 
Table I: Summary of Relevant Survey Responses 
 
Item Response mean 
in Germany 
(S.D.) 
Response mean 
in Israel (S.D.) 
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Thinking about 
yourself, is it ok to 
use Facebook with a 
pseudonym? 
4.10  
(1.18) 
2.72 
(1.35)** 
When thinking about 
your Facebook 
contacts, how many 
of them will think 
positively of your 
using Facebook with 
a pseudonym? 
4.07 
(2.98) 
2.98** 
(1.39) 
How concerned are 
you about falling for 
a fake profile of an 
organization on 
Facebook?   
2.13 
(.93) 
2.43 ** 
(.95) 
How concerned are 
you about falling for 
a fake profile of a 
person on Facebook?   
2.10 
(.93)  
2.32** 
(.99) 
**p<.001 (statistical significance of difference in results). 
  
 Table II below sums up the analysis of the eight 
governance dimensions examined above, while distinguishing 
between Germany (DE) and Israel (IL). It indicates an 
interesting story.  While the firm set an overall anti-
pseudonym governance structure, the law in the two 
jurisdictions differed.  Before any examination of the nature of 
social norms in these two countries, at least two hypotheses 
could have been posited to predict the trajectory of the 
(hypothetical form of) governance via social norms.94  One 
would be an alignment of social norms with the norms chosen 
by the firm (and implemented by code and contract) – as 
opposed to those reflected in the selections made by the 
government.  The other would be an alignment of social norms 
with those reflected by the law (and thus, government) and 
opposed to those selected by the firm.  The actual results from 
 
94. For an additional discussion of instances where law and social norms 
converge or diverge, see Oermann et al., supra note 1, at 36-37. 
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the survey clearly demonstrate that the latter option 
predominated; both Israeli and German respondents provided 
answers which correlated with the norms reflected by the local 
laws. 
The comparative aspects of this study add an additional 
set of findings indicating an association between governance by 
law and social norms.  It can be argued that this correlation is 
the result of cultural differences in the conception of privacy in 
the two countries.  Thus, cultural differences in the conception 
of privacy and personal disclosure possibly shape both the law 
and the social norms of behavior on Facebook.  Of course, one 
might also argue that law shapes social norms, and vice versa. 
Establishing these causal connections calls for additional 
study, perhaps by examining changes in one of these factors 
(such as a new law, or case) and their impacts.  Yet lack of 
certainty regarding these open questions need not undermine 
the possible conclusions this study brings about, which are 
presented in the next chapter. 
 
Table II: The Governance of “Real Names” on Facebook 
 
 Code Contract Law Social 
Norms 
DE Implemented Mandated Strongly 
object 
Strongly 
object 
IL Implemented Mandated-* Weakly 
Object 
Weakly 
object 
* Some limited pro-user contractual language, in view of 
legal changes. 
 
V. Discussion of Results, Normative Conclusions and 
Important Limitations 
 
The case study presents interesting findings which could 
be integrated in various ways. The article will now review 
these findings and discuss two analytical issues. First, it 
examines these findings in light of the above theoretical 
discussion, pointing out which theories are strengthened and 
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which are possibly refuted. Secondly, with regard to the 
theoretical discussions in Part II.5 it strives to briefly 
articulate the implications of the study’s findings in terms of 
efficiency, fairness and justice. 
An important caveat should be emphasized once more. 
While the study can point to correlations and discrepancy 
among the examined factors, it cannot identify the trigger for 
such differences or the cause of these effects.  Thus, the 
conclusions below are presented cautiously, and can only 
speculate about various causation theories explaining the 
study’s findings. 
One salient way to articulate these findings is to point out 
that governance through social norms goes hand in hand with 
that set out by government, and not that set out by the firm – a 
result that emerged in both jurisdictions.  At first glance such a 
finding might seem trivial, even obvious.  Should we not expect 
laws and social norms to be aligned?  This could be explained 
either by the fact that citizens set the social norms and vote for 
their government, which implements them.  Or from a different 
perspective, social norms are shaped by the existing law.  In 
addition, should we indeed be surprised that large firms ignore 
both the law and their users’ preferences whenever possible, 
and set out to apply governance rules tailored to solely promote 
their own objectives? 
As explained above, there was indeed reason to believe 
that the realm of social media would provide results contrary to 
such intuitions.  Governance flowing from laws might prove 
inappropriate by social standards, hence removed from social 
norms, given the slow and rigid process of their acceptance, 
lack of proper oversight and other detriments.95  On the other 
hand, it is the firms that arguably have both incentives and the 
ability to quickly meet their users’ social preferences, and alter 
their governance models accordingly. 
Yet the results indicate that contrary to these arguments, 
governance through law and through social norms are closely 
linked.  Perhaps more important still, the social media do not 
introduce a reality in which firms comply with their users’ 
social norms.  Therefore, these findings cannot validate 
 
95. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. 
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theories noted above regarding firms’ motivations to meet user 
preferences.  Rather, the empirical findings indicate that the 
process of governance by code and contract is strictly top-down 
rather than bottom-up.  The similar findings in both 
jurisdictions strengthen this conclusion. 
Returning to the theoretical discussion, the reason why 
bottom-up processes ultimately did not unfold in this context 
can be explained in several ways.  First, it might be a result of 
the firm’s global policy, which adopts a uniform framework and 
chooses to ignore specific local governance initiatives.  The 
study’s findings cannot negate this theory.  Note, however, that 
the firm ignores local governance in two different geographical 
realms – Israel and Germany, the latter being a substantial 
state and also one for which Facebook chose to modify its 
contract so as to cater to it in other contexts.  Therefore, this 
explanation might have limited force. 
The difference between firm governance and the 
governance by law and social norms might result from the 
dearth of competition or high switching costs96 – both of which 
are relevant to Facebook and probably other social media 
platforms.  When the firm’s users are unable to signal their 
normative preferences, the firm moves to set governance rules 
in ways which comply with their self-interest to maximize their 
profit (rather than their users).  However, the reason for the 
perceived divergence of social norms from the firm’s 
governance might be very different.  As Cass Sunstein 
explains,97 the governance laid down by firms might indeed 
result from a bottom-up process and in response to the users’ 
preferences.  But the preferences given in the survey, which 
possibly reflect the users’ thinking as citizens, are perhaps 
different from their signaling and actions as consumers (or 
perhaps as members of a new social category: internet users). 
In that case the findings would indicate a very different form of 
regulatory failure.  Additional study is required to establish 
which of these two general theories, or perhaps yet another 
explanation, underlies the results. 
The uncertainty regarding the reasons for the study’s 
 
96. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
97. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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findings hampers the ability at this time to draw clear 
normative conclusions regarding the proper governance setting 
for social media.  Nevertheless, the most likely conclusion of 
this article’s analysis is that the firm’s managers dictate the 
nature of governance, without properly considering the full 
extent of their users’ preferences.  This generates intuitive 
discontent, which may be articulated on several analytical 
levels.  One is that of efficiency.  Arguably, a firm engaging in 
governance which counters its users’ preferences is inefficient. 
Yet structuring an efficiency-related argument at this juncture 
calls for an abundance of assumptions which go beyond the 
confines of this article, especially considering the firm’s global 
nature.  True, it might be quite efficient for a global firm to 
ignore the preferences of many of its users, given the costs of 
catering to their specific needs. 
An additional argument could be premised upon 
autonomy,98 respect and violation of possible rights.  Here one 
might argue that the firm’s disregard for users’ rights and 
preferences is normatively problematic.  This issue too requires 
extensive analysis and the formulation of various definitions in 
this specific context of the various complex terms noted above, 
and must be set aside for now as well. Accordingly, the article 
will briefly examine the implications of the governance 
dynamic described here in terms of fairness and justice, while 
adhering to this law journal symposium’s overall theme.99 
As explained above (in reference to Walzer’s work),100 a 
reality in which those controlling the firm – hence the social 
network platform – can unilaterally impact their users’ lives 
and rights is arguably unjust.101  This is true regardless of the 
 
98. For a definition of autonomy which might prove helpful for this 
discussion, see GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 20 
(Sydney Shoemaker ed., 1988). 
99. Symposium, Social Media and Social Justice, Pace Law School (Mar. 
28, 2014). 
100. See Henderson, supra note 37, at 1583. 
101. When discussing injustice, an additional argument is often adduced 
concerning injustice which might rise between different social segments.  
Given that firms govern while adhering to their own interests, subjects are 
left to face a grim reality.  But some subjects are better off than others.  
Social groups that obtain knowledge, wealth and power can ensure that their 
preferences are met by exercising their influence and sophistication, while 
weaker groups must comply with the initial rules under which they are 
35
  
2014  SOCIAL JUSTICE 189 
firm’s global nature and other efficiency-related considerations. 
The argument is strengthened by the fact that the aspects 
controlled by the few are important and relate to crucial rights 
such as privacy and identity.102  Furthermore, those in control 
were not chosen nor elected by the public.  Rather, and as 
explained above, this small group leverages its control from one 
set of contexts to another; it uses its control over the online 
platform – a right related to property and contract – to enforce 
a set of normative decisions in many walks of life. 
The injustice could be resolved by limiting the firm’s realm 
of influence and control, and assuring that governance in social 
media reflects users’ preferences as well.  The study indicates 
that the current governance process does not yield this result. 
On the other hand, the study further shows that local laws 
have the potential of properly reflecting social norms. 
Therefore, this injustice might be mitigated if governance by 
law featured more prominently in the overall mix of 
governance influences in the context of social media platforms. 
This could be achieved by broader laws and stricter 
implementation of rules that reject the firm’s attempts to 
circumvent the relevant country’s jurisdiction.103 
 
VI. Conclusions, Complications and Future Extensions 
 
The comparative study presented above provides 
substantial foundations for future research on social media 
governance. A possible way forward on the basis of data 
 
subjected. While this argument is often set forth in such situations, it is 
difficult to apply it in the present context; it is indeed hard to see how 
influence and sophistication will make a substantial difference in addressing 
Facebook's harsh governance policies, through contract or code.  One might 
even note that those that belong to stronger groups have more to lose given 
the application of "real name" policies.  Given these difficult questions, this 
argument is currently set aside. 
102. For a discussion of the importance of identity and how it is related 
to the use of "real name" policies, see Zarsky & Andrade, supra note 31, at 
1360. 
103. For instance, the actions of Facebook, as described in note 83 and 
the relevant text. For a different recent example regarding Google (and 
Google Spain), and how such an argument was rejected, see Case C-131/12, 
Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 2014 E.C.R. ¶ 
58-60. 
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already collected pertains to the “right to be forgotten” – 
individuals’ ability to mandate the deletion of information 
pertaining to them from third-party datasets, even when such 
data are accurate and complete.  The governance-based study 
examined this issue as well.  It mapped out the forms of 
governance unfolding with regard to code, contract and law.  It 
also included a relevant question in the survey.  This question 
too bore an interesting result, indicating a significant 
difference between Israel and Germany. Table III notes the 
question and the average responses in the two countries. 
However, at the time of writing, this specific issue has 
been subjected to a drastic change, which somewhat sets this 
aspect of the research back.  This specific case-study 
demonstrates the difficulty in researching such a dynamic 
issue. In June 2014, the European Court of Justice ruled that 
in many cases, and according to the EU Data Protection 
Directive, individuals have the right to demand that a platform 
remove and delete data at the data subject’s discretion, even if 
they are correct and complete (yet possibly irrelevant at this 
time).104  So the rule of law regarding the “right to be forgotten” 
in both Germany and Israel (which is not subjected to the EU 
Directive, yet is influenced by it) will possibly change further. 
Moreover, regulation by code has changed as well. As the court 
found that Google cannot escape EU jurisdiction on this 
matter, Google was forced to react quickly.105  It did so by 
creating an online form which allows EU users to request 
removal of specific links, and has began to act on these 
requests.106  It is most likely that social media platforms – not 
only search engines – will alter their practices in view of this 
ruling and Google’s actions.  This might even impact public 
opinion and social norms regarding this specific matter.107  In 
 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Mark Scott, Google Ready to Comply With ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ 
Rules in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2014, 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/18/google-ready-to-comply-with-right-
to-be-forgotten-rules-ineurope/. 
107. For a very recent survey indicating popularity of the “right to be 
forgotten” among American – a result which was not necessarily predictable, 
see: DANIEL HUMPHRIES, SOFTWARE ADVICE, U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD THE 
'RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN: INDUSTRY VIEW (2014), available at 
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view of this, the study’s current findings on the “right to be 
forgotten” must be revisited.  Still, the historical data gathered 
in this study regarding the "right to be forgotten" issue will 
make for a better understanding of the reasons for (or 
causation of) the differences among governance models, should 
these arise. 
Beyond reliance on the study’s existing findings, the 
project noted above sets forth an overall methodology for 
studying the relations among various forms of governance.  The 
research group’s general aspiration is to expand this analysis 
not only to broader privacy-related questions with regard to 
digital media, but to issues of copyright policy and abusive 
content as well.  To that end, the theoretical assumptions on 
the balance of the four governance models must be 
reexamining and possibly recalibrated.  Additional jurisdictions 
will be examined as well, for a wider exploration of the 
findings.  In addition, I do hope that other scholars from a 
variety of fields will choose (even partially) to apply this 
methodology and contribute to a better understanding of the 
crucial notion of governance in the digital age. 
 
Table III: Social Norms and the Right to Be Forgotten 
 
Item Response mean 
in Germany (SD) 
Response mean in 
Israel (SD) 
Respondents were 
asked: How 
concerned are you 
that Facebook will 
keep your personal 
data even after 
you delete your 
account (“0” – not 
concerned; “5” – 
very concerned) 
3.41 
(.87) 
2.59** 
(.98) 
**p<.001 (measure of statistical significance). 
 
 
http://www.softwareadvice.com/security/industryview/right-to-be-forgotten-
2014. 
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